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I. Introduction
Recent theories of the business cycle have emphasized the misallocations associated with unobserved aggregate shocks.' Agents are assumed to have insufficient information to distinguish changes in theivrelative position from those in their absolute position. Here we (levelop an equilibrium model in which an aggregate shock (which, e.g., the relatively lucky firms do not increase employment more than they would if their workers had perfect information, while the unlucky firms decrease employment more than they would if their workers had perfect information.
Section IV extends the analysis to demand shocks. We consider an economy in which there are three final consumption goods, of' which two, X and Y, are produced from intermediate goods, K1 and K2, while the third is not produced using current resources (e.g., it represents real balances or the capital stock). The economy is subjected to two types of shocks, only one of' which is observable to workers. First, the distribution of endowed wealth changes, which changes the de- When workers in a particular intermediate good industry, say industry 1, observe a shock to the relative prices of X and Y, they do not know how that affects their marginal value product, because they do not know whether X or Y is intensively using the output K1 they produce. Note, however, that when relative prices are not very dispersed, it does not matter as f'ar as the workers' marginal value product is concerned whether X or Y is using K1 intensively. Tile model, therefore, has the property that an observed increase in the dispersion of relative final goods prices causes an increase in the uncertainty workers have about their own marginal value products. This situation, where each worker knows more about general economic conditions than about conditions in his own industry (since each consumes goods produced in many industries), is in contrast to Lucas's (1972) assumption that workers know more about their own firmns' price than they know about the economy-wide price level.
Using the results of' Sections II and III, Section IV shows that an increase in the dispersion of relative prices that leaves the complete information Walrasian equilibrium unchanged causes a fall in employment under asymmetric information. This is proved under the assumption that, ex ante, workers and firms write an optimal labor contract that appropriately is conditioned on everything that will be observable to both parties. Therefore, the contractionary effect of aggregate shocks occurs despite the fact that contracts are conditioned on these shocks. This is in contrast to models such as Taylor (1980) or Blanchard (1979) where observable shocks affect output because wage contracts cannot be conditioned on them. 910 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY Section V contains our interpretations, conclusions, and some references to evidence. In particular we suggest the importance of' publicly observed but unanticipated changes in the price level (or rate of' inflation) in a monetary economy. When a large percentage of individual wealth is held in the form of nominally denominated assets or liabilities, then changes in the price level will cause a redistribution of wealth between nominal borrowers and nominal lenders. This wealth redistribution can be the source of' shocks to the relative demands for goods if borrowers and lenders have different tastes. Output can contract as a consequence of an increase in the relative price dispersion created by the wealth redistribution. A wealth redistribution that would have no effect on total employment when agents have symmetric information will cause employment to fall when they are asymmetrically informed.
II. The Optimal Employment Contract
We begin by analyzing the optimal contract between a single firm and its workers. For now, we do not distinguish physical productivity shocks from relative demand shocks. Thus we let ? represent a shock to the marginal value product of labor; that is, output q is given by q = sf (l), ~~~~~(1) where I is total employment in the firm, andf is a production function satisfying f' > 0, f" < 0, f'(0) = x, and f'(oo) = 0. We regard q as "real" output or revenue. We adopt a 2-period model. At initial date 0 the firm and workers have the same information. Neither party knows s (s denotes the realization of's), but both know the distribution of s. At date 1 the firm observes s, but the workers do not. This asymmetry reflects the reasonable presumption that management knows more about relevant demand and cost conditions than do workers. Because of' the asymmetry, the wage bill cannot depend on s directly (if the firm were asked to report s, it would claim the s that minimized total wages). However, the workers and firm both observe I and some public information n. Hence the total wage bill w can depend on n and I. We assume that q is not observed by the workers.
Labor is supplied perfectly elastically at a real wage rate of' R per unit at date 1; that is, a worker's utility of real income I and labor I is U(I -Rl), where U' > 0 and U" S 0. Let U be the expected utility at time 0 that a worker at this firm could obtain elsewhere. We shall suppose, for simplicity, that the firm can hire only one worker (Grossman and Hart [1981, p. 304] show that real values are unaffected if the firm can have many identical workers).
An optimal contract specifies a wage rule w(l, P) and an employment rule 1(?, P) that maximize the firm's expected utility given that the worker's expected utility is at least U. Note that since the worker cannot observe s directly, the contract must induce the firm to choose l = I(s, n), given w(l, n), when s = s and P = n. The firm will do so if' sf[I(s, n)]w[I(s, n), n]sf(bw(l, n)
(2) for all s, 1, n; that is, if l(s, n) maximizes ex post profit f'or the firm at date 1 when s = s, P = n, given the wage rule w(l, P).2 We assume that the owners of the firm are risk averse and have a utility of' profit V(qw), where V is strictly concave.3 Thus an optimal contract maximizes EV{sf[1(9, n)] -w[l(s, n), P]} (3) subject to (2) and E U{w [ l (s, n), n] -R R (, n)} ? U.
(4)
Expectations are taken with respect to the joint distribution of'?s and ii, which is assumed to be known to both the firm and worker at time 0. If the worker could observe s, then an optimal employment contract would set the marginal value product of labor equal to the value of the marginal disutility of effort R and choose the wage bill to share risk optimally between the firm and the worker. We denote this complete information employment rule by 1*(9), where sf'[l*(s)] = R f'or all s.
(5) Grossman and Hart (1981) showed that when the worker has no information n about the realization of' s, the optimal employment function I(s) is everywhere below I*(s) except at the highest s. This result extends to the case where workers can observe n at time 1. In the following proposition, [s(n), s-(n)] denotes the support of' the conditional distribution of' s given n. " The assumption that we can treat the firm as risk averse makes sense if'either (() the owners cannot diversify away the riskiness of their shares in the firm or (b) the firm is run by a risk-averse manager who suppplies an ullObservetl in1)ut (e.g., "entrepreneurial effort") and whose salary depends on the firm's performance. Folr elaborations of the second justification, see HolHastror an Weissr(l1 X2) and I latt (1I983). PROPOSITION 1. If 101(s, n) and w('(1, n) form an optimal contract, that is, maximize (3) subject to (2) and (4), then 10(s, n) < 1*(s) for all s and n, with equality if s = s(n). Furthermore, if', for each n, either (a) the conditional distribution of s is continuous or (b) it is discrete and the worker is risk neutral, then 1"(s, n) < 1*(s) almost surely for those realizations s less than T(n).4
The first part of proposition 1 is established in Hart (1983) . Part b is also proved there, while a follows from an application of the results of Grossman and Hart (1981) .
To illustrate this proposition, suppose that fi takes on two possible values, nI and n2. Assume that when n = n I, s = sI always, so there is no uncertainty; whereas when n = n2, s can assume two values _ and s. Clearly the conditionally optimal contract for n = n1 entails efficient employment, l*(sl), since there is no uncertainty. On the other hand, when n = n2, 1(s, n2) < I*(s) (assuming risk neutrality for the worker) by proposition 1.
To understand proposition 1 in this case, suppose instead that a labor contract induced the full information employment rule, 1*(s). held with strict inequality, we could raise w(s) and lower w(s) to keep the mean wage the same. This would not affect the worker if he were risk neutral but would help the firm by reducing its risk. Hence (2') must hold with equality (it is immediate that, if' [2'] holds with equality, the other incentive constraint for s s holds). From (2') and (2"), it is clear that the only way to reduce -r2 -I while still maintaining (2') with equality is to reduce 1(s) below 1*(s) and raise w(s)w(s). Moreover, such a change is desirable, assuming the worker is risk neutral, since the consequent loss of output is a secondorder effect (starting from efficiency) but the gain in risk reduction for the firm is of the first order. Note also that since deviations in 1(s) from l*(s) do not affect 'T2 -7l, it is optimal to set 1(s) = 1*(s).
For the remainder of the paper, when applying proposition 1, we shall suppose that either case a or case b holds.
Risk neutrality of the worker is a stronger assum11ption1 than is necessary. All that is required is that the worker be not too risk averse. UNEMPLOYMENT 
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III. General Equilibrium with Physical Productivity Shocks
We now embed the partial equilibrium model of Section II in a very simple general equilibrium model of contracts. In this model aggregate shocks affect the marginal physical productivity of labor. As in Section II, each firm i has a production function q= si (1).
We imagine that there is a steady state for the economy in which firms earn no rents. In this steady state, all firms find labor equally profitable; that is, s1 =S = ... = s*. Now imagine that the economy is hit by a shock that induces a nondegenerate distribution of's across firms. We assume that the owner of each firm knows his own s but that his worker knows only the cross-sectional distribution of s. Lacking any further knowledge, each worker assumes that his firm's s is a random drawing from that distribution. In the notation of the previous section, let P be the signal observed by firms and workers about the economy-wide shock. Let F(son) be the cross-sectional distribution of' productivities associated with the realization P = n. Denote the news that no shock has occurred by h = n*; that is, this is the steady state where s, = s* for all i. We assume that every n 5 n* leads to a nondegenerate distribution of s in the sense that var (s]n) > 0 for all it #4 n*.
It is useful to consider the Walrasian (or complete information) employment level associated with a particular cross-sectional distribution of g. A firm with si = s sets sf'(1*) = R.
This defines the employment level 1*(s). Thus for a given crosssectional distribution F(sln), economy-wide employment is relit) L*(n) = 1* (s)dF (s In),
where s(n) and Ts(n) are the bounds on the realization of's. Note that for the no-shock situation, total employment is L*--L*(n*) = 1*(s*)N,
where N is the number of firms. Suppose now that the worker in firm i can observe ,. and n but not si. Appealing to proposition 1 of Section II, we see that when the cross- 
since the asymmetry of' information is irrelevant when there is no shock.
Using (12) and (13) we may compare the asymmetric and full information employment levels. In the steady state, total employment equals L* under both symmetric and asymmetric information. Assume now that a shock hits the economy inducing a nondegenerate cross-sectional distribution of f. In general, some firms gain from this shock while others lose. The lucky firms will raise employment, whereas the losers will diminish it.
If the move from n* to n causes total Walrasian employment to fall below L*, (12) and (13) imply that, under asymmetric information, the decline in total employment is greater, that is, it is multiplied. On the other hand, if total Walrasian employment rises when n* goes to n the increase must be smaller under asymmetric information; there is a "divider" effect. Finally, any movement from n* to n that keeps the total level of' Walrasian employment constant will lead to a decrease in aggregate employment under asymmetric information.
We see, therefore, that the effect of the asymmetry of information is itself asymmetric between "up shocks" and "down shocks" (where these are defined relative to total Walrasian employment). In the case of down shocks, the fall in Walrasian employment is exacerbated, whereas in the case of up shocks the rise is diminished. The model thus contrasts with that of Lucas (1972) , in which asymmetric information has a (symmetric) multiplier effect on both up and down shocks.
Note that there is some reason to believe that the non-Walrasian effects of our model will be short run. For if the shock is permanent, there should be a flow of resources from adversely affected firms or industries to beneficially affected ones. This reallocation will tend to equalize the profitability of labor, returning the economy to a steady state. UNEMPLOYMENT 
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IV. Relative Demand Shocks
We next study uncertainty caused by relative demand shocks. Such uncertainty is more difficult to formalize than that from productivity shocks. The additional complication is rewarded, however, by a richer model. Moreover, relative demand shocks are arguably more important in practice as a source of' uncertainty.
One possible cause of' relative demand shocks is redistribution of' wealth (induced, perhaps, by unanticipated changes in inflation). If' workers do not know how a shift in demand affects their own firm, a redistribution of' wealth may increase their uncertainty about their marginal value product. This uncertainty may cause a decline in aggregate employment relative to the Walrasian level.
There are a number of' difficulties in f`ornmalizing this idea. First, the process we are trying to capture is intrinsically dynanaic: a demand shift alters prices, which in turn influence employment, which then further affects demand, and so on. Ideally, we should use an intertemporal, monetary model. Instead, ours is nonmionetary and static.
Second, there is a special problem with modeling shocks to demand rather than to productivity, namely, that if' firms operate in competitive product markets, the demand they face is completely summarized by the relative prices of their products. If' workers buy these products, they cannot have imperfect information about their firm's demand.9
To get around this problem, we assume that some firms produce intermediate goods at prices that consumers do not observe. Thus a worker does not know how a change in the demiianid f'or a final consumption good affects the demand for the particular interiiiediate good produced by his firm. All he knows is that his firni's price is a random drawing from the current cross-sectional distribution of all intermediate good prices.
Consider a competitive economy with two produced consumption goods X and Y and two intermediate goods KI and K >. There is also an unproduced third consumption good Z. There are firms that produce good K1 (type 1 firms) and others that produce good Kit (type 2 firnis).
Both types have the same concave, differentiable production ftulction,f(l), where I is labor input, as in Section II. Goods X and Y are produced without labor according to the linear production 5If there are no futures markets, and labor at time t is usecl to produce goods at tillme t + 1, then it might appear that workers and firms could have different information about the value of employing labor at t. However, if the workers' wage at late t + I clan depend on the date t + 1 spot prices that the firm learns at t, then one call showm that employment in an optimal contract is the same as if both the firm and workers ob)servred the date t + 1 spot price at date t. 
where 0 is the realization of a random variable 0. We assume that 0 takes two values: l/2 + b with probability l'(2 1/2b with probability '/2, where 0 < b < '/2. When 0 > '/2, industry Y finds K, a more productive input than K2, while industry X finds the opposite true. The roles are reversed when 0 < '/2. We will see that, when 0 > '2,, industry Y uses only K,, and industry X uses only K2. Thus, when 0 > '2, an increase in the final demand for X relative to Y is beneficial for type 2 firms, whereas when 0 < '/2 it is adverse. That is, the benefits that intermediate good firms derive from changes in final demand depend on the realization of 0. We normalize the price of the third consumption good Z to be 1. Thus the worker can make good inferences about his own firm's price if the dispersion of P, and P, is small but correspondingly poor inf'erences for large dispersions.(i We next study optimal labor contracts between firms and workers in the intermediate good industries. To (1o so we first specify agents' preferences. 
Workers and Firms in the Intermediate Good Industries
The only role of the other consumers is to generate changes in relative prices when the wealth distribution changes. We could alternatively have considered a wealth redistribution between firms and workers, but it is more difficult to characterize the optimal labor contract when workers and firms have different tastes for consumer goods. We now apply proposition 1 to the asymmetric information contract equilibrium. For a given realization of i= (P=, Pi), there will be a "lucky" intermediate goods industry (one whose output price is high) and an "unlucky" industry (i.e., if Px > Pi, industry 2 is lucky if 0 > ?/2 and unlucky if 0 < ?2 and conversely for industry 1). One difference between (27)-(29) and (2)-(4) is that workers and firms are interested in real income P1P2p) rather than in I. Given that Pa, PR are publicly observable, however, proposition 1 generalizes to this case (for details, see Hart [ 1983] ). Hence, we may conclude that a firm in the lucky industry will equate the marginal value product of labor and the marginal disutility of' effort, whereas a firm in the unlucky industry will set the marginal product of labor above the marginal disutility of effort. Specifically, when, say, P, -PX, employment (x in (41) .
We now show that if the distribution of wealth induces prices that create uncertainty for workers about their marginal value products, then total employment is lower than with complete information. Furthermore, the prices of both produced goods are higher and the outputs are lower than their Walrasian levels.1 I " Note that if a monetary contraction causes the change in the distribution of wealth, then prices of goods relative to the nonproduced good (money) will fall rather than rise. An implication of our result is that the decreasee in stipply associated with the increased uncertainty will cause prices in terms of money to fall less than they would under complete information. -clearing conditions (38) and (3 1) yield  1x > 1. Thus, the marginal productivity conditions (40) and (36) Notice that although only one intermediate goods industry is unlucky in the sense of setting marginal product above marginal disutility, both are unlucky in suffering employment levels below the Walrasian level. Thus, there is something resembling a multiplier that, through general equilibrium effects, transforms the sub-Walrasian output and employment of one sector into a general "recession."
As in Section III, proposition 2 implies that, if we start in the steady state PX = PX, (1) a demand shock that creates price dispersion and keeps total Walrasian employment constant will reduce total employment under asymmetric information; (2) a shock that reduces Walrasian employment will reduce employment under asymmetric information by more; and (3) a shock that increases Walrasian employment will increase employment under asymmetric information by less.
We see that changes in the distribution of wealth will cause relative price movements, which create uncertainty on the part of laborers 12 We must emphasize that proposition 2 depends importantly on the ordinal (i.e., Cobb-Douglas) preferences we have assumed (although we could have assumed any number of goods). The result generalizes to utility functions Over X, Y, and Z of the form ?(X, Y)AZ I -, where goods X and Y are gross complements. UNEMPLOYMENT 923 about their marginal value product. We have used the convention that unequal final goods prices are associated with uncertainty about the marginal value product of labor within each industry. To see that this is just a convention, note that in a world of perfect certainty free entry leads resources to be allocated across industries in such a way that prices are determined by minimum average costs. When firms have identical production functions, minimum average costs are the same. If we instead began with industries that had different cost functions, then the steady-state (no shock) situation would lead to final goods prices that are unequal. However, the profitability of labor would be equalized across industries. A shock that changed relative demands would, in the short run, cause the profitability of hiring labor to be unequal across industries. If workers knew only the (distribution of profitabilities across industries and they thought their firm's labor profitability were a random drawing from that distribution, then a shock that changed demand from its steady-state value would cause uncertainty about labor productivity within each industry. By the arguments of this section, this would cause a drop in employment relative to the Walrasian level.
V. Evidence and Conclusions
A. Relative Price Variability as a Cause ou/Aggregate Output Variability
In Section IV we outlined a model in which relative price shocks inake workers uncertain about their marginal value products. Firms have superior information about marginal products but are risk averse; when the profitability of employing labor in a given firm is low, it would like to reduce the wage bill. Because of the asymmetry of' information, it cannot do this directly but must also reduce the employment level to persuade workers that their marginal products really are low. Before discussing potential sources for the relative price shocks, we offer some evidence that is consistent with the implication that relative price shocks affect aggregate output. Note that proposition 2 implies that relative demand shocks which leave employment unchanged under full information will lower employment under asymmetric information. Thus, assuming that, on average, the actual relative demand shocks that impact on our economy would be neutral under symmetric information, our major empirical implication is that aggregate employment will fall, on average, in response to relative demand shocks. Lilien (1982) has presented evidence that the level of unemploy-ment tends to be high when the cross-sectional variability of net employment is high. He found that the cross-sectional variability of employment can explain at least as much of the unemployment as can unanticipated decreases in the money supply. Unfortunately, Lilien does not examine the relationship between relative price shocks and the cross-sectional variability of net employment. Fischer (1982) surveys the literature on relative price variability. He also studies the time-series behavior of aggregate output, relative price variability, and other macroeconomic variables. In a vector autoregression, relative price variability, when "put first," explains as much of the variability of output as interest rate, money, or inflation innovations (see his table 8), that is, about 10 percent of' the total variability of' output. When relative price variability is "put after" interest rates, money, and inflation, it does as well as inflation and money but worse than interest rates.
The comparatively high explanatory power of' relative price variability for output is, of course, consistent with models other than ours. For example, all Fischer's results are consistent with a Walrasian model in which agents receive information that future output will fall but that components of output will fall in differing proportions. With a conventional money demand model this implies that prices will rise in the future in differing proportions, in turn raising present prices in differing proportions. Thus, the future decrease in output induces increases in expected inflation, variability of' inflation, and nominal interest rates, which is exactly what Fischer finds. Fischer also suggests three other models that are consistent with his observations.
B. The Causes of Relative Price Variability
The model presented in Section IV assumes that a shift in the distribution of wealth creates a change in relative prices. There are clearly many sources of relative price variability other than changes in the distribution of' wealth, for example, variability in technology, tastes, and the prices of' imports and exports. We have focused on wealth redistribution to allow for comparisons with existing macroeconomic models.
In particular, assume that there is a wealth redistribution between nominal borrowers and lenders after an unanticipated movement in the price level. (Although our model has no money, it would not be difficult to append an additively separable utility of' real balances to preferences. Furthermore, we could model borrowing and lending associated either with life-cycle effects or random shocks to income. I 3) 13 See Grossman In the United States, 50 percent of'"wealth" is held in the form of' nominal debt.' If the economy is composed of' two types of' individuals, nominal borrowers and lenders, who share other wealth equally, then a 10 percent permanent drop in the price level increases the real wealth of lenders by 50 percent of' 10 percent, or 5 percent. Borrowers' wealth falls by the same amount. To the extent that the permanent drop of 10 percent in the price level is associated with expected deflation, there will be a second effect in the wealth distribution in the same direction. Namely, the real price of long-term nominal debt will rise due to the decrease in the nominal interest rate. People over 55 (the "old") tend to be nominal creditors while people under 55 (the "young") tend to be nominal debtors. Fischer and Modigliani (1978) estimate (to within an order of magnitude) that a 1 percent unanticipated increase in the price level will transfer wealth with a flow value of' about 1 percent of GNP.
Wealth redistributions have no effect on relative prices if' wealth is redistributed between groups that have the same homothetic pref'erences. However, there is some evidence that there are systematic dif'ferences by age among individuals in their preferences. Michael (1979, p. 41 ) used the Bureau of Labor Statistics' consumer expenditure survey to find that there are systematic and significant dif'ferences among individuals' consumption proportions by age. The classification of borrowers and lenders by age may not be the most useful for tracing the consequences of' the wealth redistribution. We mention it here because it is the only classification fOr which there is evidence that individuals are jointly sorted by desired consumption proportions and debt positions.
There are some other obvious sources of' wealth redistributions that may be of sufficient magnitude to have caused observed output fluctuations. For example, unanticipated changes in nominal interest rates due either to real or to nominal factors redistribute wealth between long-term borrowers and lenders, and this could be a source of' relative price variability. Alternatively, large decreases in the real value of' assets such as houses and stocks can cause substantial redistransftormation could be made here. An essential difference is that our model of' Sec.
IV will not work with complete endowment insurance. If' the two different types of' traders have perfectly inspired ea(h other, then the particular realii~atio)n of'the en(lowment distribution will not affect the relative wealth position.
Simllilarly,
LIUnntiiI)ate( price movemilents will have no real effects if' all contracts are indlexed.
1 See Friedmsan (1982). By "%wealth" we mean the value of total assets held by those who save. Thus, while inside det)t is not uLSually considered net wealth, it is net wealth to the consumers who are saving. If those people who pay the taxes to finance government debt interest payments are the same as the holders of government debt, then the wealth redistribution will only be associated with inside (lebt. 926 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY tributions of' wealth between the young and the old. Finally, exogenous changes in the productivity of' capital could be the cause of' a change in the real value of assets.
C. Relative versus Aggregate Demand Shifts
The previous discussion may obscure some of the difference between our model and aggregate demand models of' the business cycle. To the extent that changes in aggregate demand cause wealth redistributions that induce employment fluctuations, there is some similarity between our model and aggregate demand models. One important difference, however, is that there is no reason in our model why the sign of the aggregate demand shock should matter. A large unanticipated inflation can cause the same relative price shift as a large unanticipated deflation. Hence there is no presumption that unanticipated inflation is expansionary whereas unanticipated deflation is contractionary. To a first approximation (i.e., where the Walrasian equilibrium total output is independent of the wealth distribution), the absolute value of the unanticipated price level change should be negatively correlated with output in our model. Furthermore, if' relative price variability is an independent variable explaining output, then unanticipated inflation should have little incremental explanatory power.
Blejer and Leiderman (1980) and Fischer (1982) use innovations in inflation and relative price variability as explanatory variables for output. Their results suggest that each variable has some independent explanatory power for output in the post-World War II United States . Fischer (1982, fig. 3 ) and Sims (1980, table 3) both find that in the post-World War II period positive price innovations precede a decrease in output. We conclude from this evidence that, in the post-World War II period, although the data suggest an independent effect of' price innovations, the signs are the reverse of those predicted by the models of Sargent, Lucas, or Barro (see Barro [1981] for a survey of models in which unanticipated inflation causes an increase in output).
The period before World War II is likely to be favorable to the unanticipated inflation model. Sims (1980, table 3) finds that negative price innovations precede decreases in output in the period between World War I and World War II. Unfortunately, we have not been '-jf course in a Walrasian model it is possible that a wealth redistribution from group A to group B will cause an expansion of output while the revel-se redistribution will cause a contraction.
However, we prefer to maintain the presumption that the wealth redistribution has no effect on the Walrasian equilibrium.
UNEMPLOYMENT 927 able to find any evidence that distinguishes the relative price variability hypothesis from the unanticipated inflation hypothesis in that period. In the pre-World War II period, large unanticipated deflation may well be a proxy for high variability of relative prices. This is consistent with the data of tables 2 and 6 in Parks (1978) . Thus it seems that further empirical research is needed to distinguish the hypothesis that unanticipated falls in money (or prices) decrease output from the hypothesis that monetary or price level shocks of any sign decrease output. In addition, further theoretical research is required to develop models in which the sign of the publicly observed shock, as well as its size, affects output. One such contribution is that of Holmstrom and Weiss (1982) , who suggest that when individuals confuse idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, as in Lucas (1972) , the direction of aggregate shocks matters.
